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RECENT BOOKS
BooK R.Evmws
AN A,.,rnrucAN EXPERIENCE IN RoMAN LAW. By A. Arthur Schiller.
Gottingen, Germany: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 1971. Pp. 256.
This collection of the author's articles written over nearly forty
years of a scholarly career devoted in large measure to Roman law
makes a sad book-not sad because the contents are in any way sad,
but sad because no other fitting publication could be put together to
honor the occasion of Professor Schiller's retirement from full-time
teaching at Columbia Law School. In any major Western European
country the retirement of that country's most distinguished Roman
lawyer would have been an occasion for a Festschrift, a volume,
or perhaps several volumes, of essays ·written by others in the field
and dedicated to him. In America, however, who would write such
essays? How many American law professors, much less students, even
know that Arthur Schiller is the most distinguished living American
Roman lawyer?
The study of Roman law in American law schools has probably
never been at a lower ebb. Leaving to one side the Louisiana law
schools, which, in deference to that state's civil law tradition, still
manage to maintain some instruction in Roman law, hardly more
than a handful of American law schools have courses or seminars in
the field, much less support a faculty member who devotes even some
of his scholarly time to its study. Seminar, the annual extraordinary
number of The Jurist, in which four of the articles reprinted in this
volume originally appeared, has ceased publication. The Riccobono
Seminar of Roman Law, before which three of the papers in this
volume were originally delivered, no longer meets. The modest
revival of interest in Roman law, stimulated by the presence here
during the Second World vVar of many foreign scholars with a
knowledge of the field, seems to have run its course with the return
of those scholars to Europe, or their death or retirement.
There are a few bright spots in this otherwise gloomy picture.
A large private gift to the University of California Law School at
Berkeley for a library in Roman and canon law has brought one
of the world's leading Romanists to that school from England. There
seems to be a revival of interest in Roman law among Classicists
and ancient historians, and some funds are available for training
young scholars in those fields to teach Roman law. After many years
without any Roman law at all, the University of Michigan can now
boast both undergraduate and graduate instruction in the field. But
these glimmerings hardly dispel the general gloom.
All of this could be borne, perhaps with some nostalgic regret,
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if it could be demonstrated that the study of Roman law is not
worthwhile, at least, not worthwhile for lawyers. I do not believe,
however, that this is the case.
The traditional argument for studying Roman law is based on
the fact that it lies at the root of much of the law of the civilized
world. Roman law shares with the common law the distinction of
being one of the two basic legal systems in the world today. Since
the modern American lawyer may come into contact with civil law
systems, he must be prepared to deal with the Roman law principles
and terminology that lie at the root of those systems. Furthermore,
the argument continues, if one has little time to study the civil law,
a study of the part of the system that the civil law countries have in
common will enable one to go to the particulars of their codes when
necessary.
While this argument has some force, it can be met with a counterargument. If one's purpose is to learn something about the modern
civil law, might it not be better to study the modem civil codes
themselves, with occasional references to the Roman law to explain
their common features? After all, the differences between, say, German and French law are almost as great as the similarities, and no
one today could seriously claim any real grasp of either country's
system simply on the basis of a knowledge of Roman law.
A more powerful argument, I think, for the study of Roman law
lies in the fact that it is a fully developed system of law that treats many
of the same problems as our own, but in a very different way. This
fact has several ramifications: First, as private lawmaking through
contract and public lawmaking through statutory change become
increasingly important parts of the lawyer's job, it is well for the
lawyer to have at his fingertips a stock of institutions and ideas that
he can bring to bear on a legal problem. If the common law solution
of a problem is inappropriate, something in the Roman law might
be of help. Second, one of the most valuable parts of legal training
is the experience it gives the student in manipulating fundamental
legal ideas. What is a tort? How does an obligation in tort differ from
one in contract? What is an estate in land? Does the concept of an
estate in land serve any function today that could not be served in
other ways? The fundamental legal ideas of Roman law are quite
different from our own. A study of them helps us to penetrate our
own system and to understand more precisely what our concepts
mean and how we are using them. Third, the Roman law system was
not static. It developed greatly over the period in which it was in
effect, and a study of the course of that development permits the
student to comprehend how and why legal systems change. Finally,
no legal system operates in a vacuum. Roman law shaped Roman
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society, and that society shaped Roman law. Roman society was
sufficiently different from our own that a study of Roman law allows
the student to begin to make meaningful generalizations about the
relationship of law and society; yet Roman society was not so different from our own that there are insuperable barriers to understanding it.
I will attempt to illustrate the value of Roman law study from
Professor Schiller's work. Schiller has had a long and fruitful career.
Over twenty-five articles, innumerable book reviews, and several
books bearing his name can be found through a casual examination
of standard American bibliographic aids. A more thorough search
would certainly reveal more. Schiller's career has not been devoted
entirely to Roman law. He has always been intrigued by Egypt under
the Romans and in the Coptic period.1 During the Second World
·war he became interested in the then Dutch East Indies,2 and recently he has published some articles on the law of modem East
Africa. 3 Like many American law professors, he has devoted a considerable amount of time to producing teaching materials, some in
the Roman law area, and others only tangentially related to Roman
law.4
Roman law, however, has provided not only the topic for the
bulk of Professor Schiller's writings but also the springboard for his
more broadly comparative work. That he should write about such
disparate places as Indonesia, East Africa, and ancient and early
medieval Egypt will not surprise anyone who has examined his
treatment in this volume of the interplay between Roman law and
Egyptian law in the late empire.5 Indonesia and East Africa, like
Roman Egypt, were colonized countries in which native law existed
side by side with the law of the colonial power. Just as Roman
influence in Egypt declined during the Coptic period, so too has
colonial influence declined in Indonesia and East Africa today. Similarly, Schiller's interest in tracing the modem counterparts of Roman
institutions and doctrines in both civil and common law jurisdictions
1. See, e.g., Schiller, Coptic Law, 43 JuRID. REV. 211 (1931); Schiller, Prolegomena to
the Study of Coptic Law, 2 ARCHIVES D'HISTOIRE DU DROIT ORIENTAL 341 (1938).
2. See, e.g., Schiller, Labor Law and Legislation in the Netherlands Indies, 5 FAR
EASTERN Q. 176 (1946); Schiller, Conflict of Laws in Indonesia, 2 FAR EAsn:RN Q. 31
(1942).

3. See, e.g., Schiller, Draft Legislation and Customary Law, 5 E. AFRICA L.J. 88
(1969).
4. See, e.g., A. SCHILLER, MILITARY LAW (1952); A. SCHILLER, ROMAN LAw: TEXTS AND
COMMI:NTARY FOR THE STUDY OF ROMAN LAW (1936); F. DEAK &: A. SCHILLER, INTRO·
DUCOORY READINGS AND MATERIALS TO THE STUDY OF COMPARATIVE LAW (mimeo. ed.

1932).

5.

A. SCHILLER,

Sources and Influences of the Roman Law, III-VI Centuries A.D.,

in AN AMERICAN EXPERIENCE IN ROMAN LAW 10-23 (1971), at 20-22.
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makes it predictable that he would undertake such a study as The
Counterpart of Consideration in Foreign Legal Systems. 6
The breadth of Professor Schiller's interests has not been without
its costs. An American Experience in Roman Law contains a number
of allusions to promised work that has not yet, at least to my knowledge, been published. 7 Even greater are the number of times Schiller
suggests lines of research that he himself has not been able to pursue. 8 These are necessary, if unfortunate, concomitants of what, at
least on the law side, has been largely a one-man scholarly career.
The absence of a genuine community of Roman law scholars in
America during most of Schiller's career and the lack of a group of
advanced students to follow his suggestions have meant that Schiller
has had to undertake the whole effort by himself-determining
Roman law solutions to the problems he wants to study, pointing
out analogies to contemporary problems, bringing significant foreign
work in the Roman law field to the attention of American scholars,
and trying to synthesize his own work and that of others.
Despite these handicaps, and confining ourselves to the essays in
this volume, Schiller's is an impressive achievement. The sixteen
essays reprinted here may be roughly divided into five categories:
exposition of the work of others; document analysis; Roman commercial law; the development of late classical and post-classical law,
especially the work of the jurists; and Roman legal method.
The first category is represented by three book reviews9 and a
memorial lecture for Salvatore Riccobono.10 While some of these
essays relate Schiller's ideas to those of the scholars about whom he
is writing, their principal purpose is expository. Given the generally
low state of knowledge of Roman law among the readers of American
law journals and their general refusal to read any language other
than English, these essays serve a necessary, if somewhat pedestrian,
function.
The one example in this volume of document analysis is a careful and convincing treatment of the dating of the papyrus known
as "BGU II 628." 11 At first glance this article appears to be far re6. In 2 N.Y. LAW REVISION COMMN., ANNUAL REPORT, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 65, at 183286 (1936).
7. E.g., A. SCHILLER, AN AMERICAN Ex.PERIENCE IN ROMAN LAW 2, 25, 181 (1971).
8. E.g., id. at 23, 31, 47.
9. Review of Fritz Schultz, History of Roman Legal Science in id. at 219-25; Review
of Ernst Levy, Gesammelte Schriften in id. at 226-30; Review of Leopold Wenger, Die
Quellen des Romischen Rechts in id. at 231-40.
10. Salvatore Riccobono-ln Memoriam in id. at 242-54.
II. The First Edict of BGU II 628 Recto in id. at 179-98. For other examples of
this type of work, see \V. \VESTERMANN & A. SCHILLER, APOKRIMATA: DECISIONS OF
STEPTIMIUS SEVERUS ON LEGAL MATTERS (1954); Schiller, The Interrelation of Coptic and

Greek Papyri: P. Bu and P. BM Inv. Nos. 2017 and 2018 in STUDIEN ZUR PAPYROLOGIE
UND ANTIKEN WIRTSCHAFTSGESCHICHTE, FRIEDRICH OERTEL ZUM ACHTZIGSTEN GEBURTSTAG
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moved from the type of scholarship that I have suggested makes
Roman law relevant to lawyers today. What could be further from
modern concerns than the question of whether an edict, written on
a scrap of paper preserved for us by the dryness of the Egyptian
climate, dates from the first or the third century, AD.? ·whatever
interest, however, the piece may have £or the general reader (I found
it fascinating, but then again, I like future interests, too), this type of
work provides the essential foundation £or the study of the Roman
law in its social context, since the papyri provide evidence of how
the law was actually used. A significant conclusion of Schiller's
article is that this papyrus is one of the few surviving examples of
a document actually used in a Roman law suit. Further, if we are
ever going to have a clear idea of how Roman law developed (as opposed to what Justinian's compilers in the middle quarter of the
sixth century thought the law was in their day), we must know
precisely the provenance of the scraps of Roman law that have come
down to us independent of the Corpus Juris Civilis. BGU II 628
recto is a vital link in a long chain of evidence that tells us how
procedure before administrative officers of the emperor, the extraordinaria cognitio, came to eclipse the earlier form of procedure
before a magistrate and a lay judge. Not only is that process critical
to an understanding of modern continental procedure, but it can also
be instructively compared to the rise of the administrative process
in America today.
Professor Schiller's essays on Roman commercial law12 represent
the beginnings of an effort that is still unfinished. Considering how
his interests have changed since these essays were ·written, I suspect
that someone else will have to complete the work. The problem
that Schiller set £or himself is formidable. We know that Rome had
a highly developed commerce and that private initiative played a
fairly important role in that commerce, at least during the Republic
and the Principate. Roman commercial law, however, seems to lack
many of what we would regard as requisites £or successful private
commercial development. Its law of contract was archaic and formal;
it seems to have had little notion of agency and little in the way of
a law of trade-mark or trade secrets. We may, however, have a very
distorted view of the commercial law of the Republic and early
Empire, because the law that comes down to us was compiled at a
time when Roman commerce had been characterized by massive
state intervention £or over three centuries. We know little of the law
applied by the praetor peregrinus, the magistrate who initially heard
107-19 (H. Braunert ed. 1964); Youtie &: Schiller, Second Thoughts on the
Columbia Apokrimata (P. Col. 123), 30 CHRONIQUE D':EGYPTE 327 (1955).
12. Trade Secrets and the Roman Law; The Actio Servi Corrupti in A. SCHILLER,
supra note 7, at 1-9; The Business Relations of Patron and Freedman in Classical Roman
Law in id. at 24-40.
GEWIDMET
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law suits between citizens and noncitizens. With a few notable exceptions,13 we know even less about the law applied by the curule
aediles, the magistrate who held court in the market place.
By carefully assembling pieces of the Digest and discarding later
intrusions, Schiller attempts to show how the actio servi corrupti, the
action against a man who corrupts a slave, may have taken the place
of a formal law of trade secrets, and how in the absence of a formal
law of agency the same function may have been served by, among
other things, the status relationship between patron and freedman.
There is an important lesson here for the type of comparative study
that I have advocated. Even if the law that one is studying comparatively has no formal category corresponding to a category in one's
own law, one cannot assume that the same job is not done by the
other system in a different way. In this kind of study one must discard the legal category for a moment and look to the complex of
laws surrounding the function that one wishes to study. One must
also carefully examine the society under study to be sure that one
knows precisely where the function is being performed. Ancient
Rome knew little o1 wage laborers or salaried employees; slaves and
freedmen performed analogous roles in the Roman commercial
world, and it is to the law concerning them that one must look to
find out how trade secrets were protected and agents authorized.
Even more can be obtained from this kind of study. It is one
thing to say that Roman law had the functional equivalents of trade
secrets and agency, but it is quite another to say that these institutions operated in the same way that ours do. Granted that the law
was operating within very different categories, what was the effect
of this on Roman commerce? This far Schiller does not go. Perhaps
the evidence is simply not there. Roman commerce itself, however,
has been the subject of some fairly detailed studies,14 and the surviving papyri and wax tablets do tell something about how it made
use of the available legal institutions. We also know that the commercial law developed by the merchants in the Middle Ages (and
largely incorporated by Lord Mansfield into our own commercial
law) ,vrought radical changes in the basic Roman patterns that it had
inherited. A study of the reasons for these changes might reveal a
great deal about the fundamental interrelationships between law
and commerce in any society.
We now come to the largest category of essays-those devoted
to the topic broadly defined as the development of Roman law
from the classical period to Justinian. The first of the articles shows
13. E.g., the famous aedilician edicts implying a warranty against defects in the
sales of slaves and beasts. See DIGESr 21.1.
14. E.g., sources cited in A. SCIIlLLER, supra note 7, at I n.4. See also the works of
Arnold H.M. Jones, particularly THE LA'IER ROMAN EMPIRE 284-602: A SOCIAL EcoNo11nc AND ADMINISTRATIVE SURVEY (1964).

May 1973]

Recent Books

1281

Professor Schiller getting his feet wet in the topic.15 It still relies
heavily on the work of men older than himself, but it carefully outlines the two schools of thought existing at that time-the view of
Collinet that the non-classical elements in the Corpus Juris are to be
attributed to the influence of the law schools of Byzantium, and that
of Riccobono that Roman law developed internally between the
classical period and Justinian. Schiller cautiously suggests a middle
course and adds one further element, the coexistence of Roman law
with the native law of the provinces, as illustrated by the situation in
Egypt.
A second essay, Bureaucracy and the Roman Law 16 announces
a theme that runs through the rest of the articles in this category: the decision-making process of the late classical jurists. Thanks
to the Digest, more survives of the jurists' work than of any other
source of Roman law, and, despite the problems with interpolation and the curious extracting system used by the compilers of
the Digest, the jurists' methods can still be perceived. It is surprising,
therefore, that more work has not been done with their methods of
analysis. Schiller suggests in this article, and it is a theme to which
he returns in a number of others,17 that the position of the late
classical jurists as members of the imperial bureaucracy made them
far more conscious of the public element-what today we would call
the "social policy" element-in private law than their predecessors,
who played a purely private role. In a later work Schiller expanded
this notion and suggested that all the jurists' law, not only that of the
later jurist-bureaucrats, was policy-oriented, so that the change to
bureaucratic jurists was a change in degree and not in kind. 18
This is heady stuff, for if Schiller is right, classical Roman law
was not the beautifully arranged a priori system that some European
writers would lead us to believe it was, but rather a law groping
along on a case-by-case basis, relying on precedent, argument from
analogy, and a few maxims that do not explain case results so much
as they explain tendencies of the law. The implications of this thesis
are crucial for the purposes of the study of Roman law that I have
suggested above. If Schiller is right, then Roman law is an ideal
paradigm for studying the interaction of law and society, and the
closest modem analogy to the Roman law system is not the academic
law of Western Europe, but Anglo-American case law.
But is he right? The corpus of the Digest is vast, and little attempt has been made to organize its contents along lines that would
15. Sources and Influences of the Roman Law, III-VI Centuries A.D. in A. SCHILLER,
supra note 7, at 10-23.
16. In id. at 92-114.
17. Particularly in Jurists' Law in id. 148-60, and The Nature and Significance of
Jurists' Law in id. at 199-218.
18. Id. at 159-60.

1282

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 71

facilitate comparison with what we know about Roman economics
and society. Schiller's support for his thesis rests, to date, not so much
on the doctrines or decisions of the jurists as on the nature of the
institution. The jurists kept together as a body; like a modern court,
they were members of an ongoing institution. Their work was
closely connected with day-to-day affairs. They gave advice on drafting instruments and conducting litigation, and, perhaps most important, they gave legal opinions both to private individuals and
to government officials. These opinions were written down, disputed,
and debated until one view finally emerged as the consensus of the
group. 19 These facts make Schiller's thesis plausible, for they show
not an academic, but a highly practical group of men, deciding cases
as they came to them in much the same way that the judges at
Westminster developed the common law.
Schiller expands upon this institutional theme in two articles not
included in this volume. 20 In them he demonstrates conclusively that
at least some of the jurists were familiar with the extraordinary tribunals that were controlled by the prefects of Rome. The prefects
were outside the complex system of magistrates that the early Empire
inherited from the Republican period. They are significant not only
because they took a great deal of jurisdiction to themselves but also
because they used a very different type of procedure, the extraordinaria cognitio, mentioned earlier, in which both the law and the
facts were determined by a government official, as opposed to the
Republican procedural system in which the magistrate determined
matters of law and laymen determined matters of fact. The jurists'
interest in the system of the prefects illustrates their concern with
the actual operations of the law of their day and their willingness to
absorb new modes of law into the system of their predecessors. This
last characteristic is also illustrated in a third essay which is contained
in this volume.21 In it Schiller outlines all the cases concerning provincial matters that can be found in the known writings of the jurist
Papinian.
The last group of essays, written over a period of time, concerns
Roman legal method-specifically, the Roman notion of interpretation,22 the juridical force of custom,23 and the senatus consulta, a
peculiarly Roman type of legislation. 24 Comparative studies of legal
19. These elements are neatly summarized in id. at 153-57.
20. Schiller, The Jurists and the Praejects of Rome, 3 REVUE

INTERNATIONALE DES

DROITS DE L'ANTIQUITE 319 (1949) (in a collection of essays in honor of Fernand de
Visscher), rewritten under the same title, 57 /58 BULI.E'ITINO DELL'ISTITUTO m DIRITTO
ROMANO 60 (1953).
21. Provincial Cases in Papinian in A. SCHILLER, supra note 7, at 126-47.
22. Roman lnterpretatio and Anglo-American Legal Construction in id. at 56-91.
23. Custom in Classical Roman Law in id. at 41-55.
24. Senatus Consulta in the Principate in id. at 161-78.
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method are most valuable, since it is in looking at how other legal
systems operate, as opposed to the specific rules by which they
operate, that the lawyer can free his mind from the straitjacket created
by an exclusive focus on his own system. Of the three essays, perhaps
the most difficult but also the most rewarding is the one on interpretatio. Interpretation is essential to any legal system. In a highly
developed system like the Roman or the Anglo-American there will
be interpretation of both private instruments (contracts, wills, and
deeds) and public ones (legislation, opinions, and cases). The Romans
used the term interpretatio not only to describe the interpretation of
public and private instruments as we know it, but also to connote
the development of the law, first by the pontiffs, later by the jurists,
and finally by the emperor himself. Each of these groups may be
associated with a different type of interpretatio: the pontiffs, with
"literal interpretation," which exalts the words themselves over the
intent of the instrument and leads to the use of fictions; the later
jurists, with interpretation "ex ratione legis," which resolves ambiguities in a law by reference to its underlying principles and which
sometimes expands the scope of a law by applying those principles
to situations that the law does not specifically cover; and the emperor, with "authentic interpretation," described by Constantine
as the function of mediating between law and equity, a function
reserved to the emperor alone.
So far as the interpretation of instruments as we understand it
is concerned, the Roman rhetorical writers developed an elaborate
scheme of interpretative rules designed to allow intent to prevail
over the written word (the scriptum-voluntas distinction). Schiller
convincingly demonstrates, however, that the jurists did not adopt
this system, although they were familar with some of its distinctions,
but rather, approached each case on an individual basis with the
help of an agglomeration of principles and a strong sense of fact:
They had little use for hermeneutics: they preferred to attack each
case involving interpretation on its own merits; they made use of
all the techniques that came to hand (as well as their common sense),
not to arrive at the intention of the writer, the meaning of the words,
the reason for the law, or any one single factor, but to solve that
particular question in accordance ·with the needs of the social and
political life of their day. Roman law declined when hermeneutics
triumphed, and although this is obviously not the prime reason, I
believe that it is partly responsible. 25
If it is not too presumptuous, I would like to suggest one path,
of the many possible paths, that Professor Schiller might explore in
his retirement. His work up to now has shown a great capacity to
25. A.

SCHILLER,

supra note 7, at 91.

1284

1.v.Iichigan Law Review

[Vol. 71

synthesize the large ideas of others and suggest new ones of his own;
it has also shown great ability to construct a careful argument in the
small, assembling and analyzing bits of data to form a link in a chain
of argument. But few of his works published to date make the middle
level argument, connect his detail work with the evidence to the
larger scheme of ideas that he treats elsewhere. This gap, combined with the appalling state of Roman law teaching in the United
States today, leads me to suggest that Professor Schiller could make
a great contribution if he were to finish the revision, which I know
he has begun, of his Roman law teaching materials. Such a vehicle
would permit him to assemble the actual texts on which he relies
for his views on the methods of the jurists. To illustrate Schiller's
points, particularly for students, we do not need another textbook
on Roman law or even another monograph, but rather a casebook
of Roman law.
Such a book would be particularly valuable because some English scholars, heeding Professor Schiller's advice to look for the
social and economic factors in Roman law, have recently produced
what might be loosely described as a Marxian view of the Roman
law.26 The Roman law, according to this view, was designed at every
turn to repress the lower classes and preserve the social status quo.
I find this approach one-sided. Of course, there is some class bias
in Roman law, as in any legal system, but I suspect that the policy
motivations of the jurists were far more complex than the simple
preservation of the status quo. If the truth is to emerge, however,
the sources must be gathered in a more manageable form and reported sensitively and without bias. I can think of no one better
equipped for this task than Professor Schiller.
A final word on the book itself: Books such as this are economically feasible only because of offset printing. It is useless to complain
that the variety of type faces and footnote styles is annoying, because,
had it not been possible to photograph the journals and books in
which these articles were originally printed, the book could not
have been produced. More, I think, could have been done with the
arrangement of the essays. Rather than following the volume's generally chronological order, I would have grouped the essays by topic,
as I have done in my discussion above. In particular, Factors in the
Development of the Late Classical Law27 should have appeared before Bureaucracy and the Roman Law,28 since the former serves
nicely as a general introduction to the latter and to the material
that follows. Furthermore, although the book excludes material
26. See, e.g., J. KELLY, ROMAN LITIGATION (1966); J. CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME
(1967); P. GARNSEY, SOCIAL STATUS AND LEGAL PRIVILEGE IN THE ROMAN EMPIRE (1970).

27. In A. SCHILLER, supra note 7, at 115-25.
28. In id. at 92-II4.
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published in Europe because it is designed for European readers
who lack access to American materials, I would have included, in
order to present a more balanced view of Schiller's work, his
article on the jurists and prefects.29 Finally, the value of the book
could have been enhanced by a bibliography citing for each essay
topic at least the principal works that have appeared since the
essays were written. For example, there is much in Peter Stein's
Regulae ]uris30 that is of direct relevance to what Schiller has to say
about the use of maxims of interpretation in his article on Roman
interpretatio.31 But these are counsels of perfection. The book
serves its purpose well: It gathers from disparate and frequently
inaccessible sources the work of one man and presents it in such a
way that we can see the development of his thought. It should do
much to enhance Professor Schiller's well-deserved reputation.

Charles Donahue, Jr.,
Professor of Law,
University of Michigan
29. See note 20 supra.
30. P. Sn:IN, REGULAE JURIS (1966).
31. See note 22 supra.

